Should government provide risk management services? I exploit a natural experiment in which the government fully insures highway paving firms against oil price risk. The data permit the first firm-level study of risk management among private firms. Surprisingly, the risk shifting policy reduces costs. Capital requirements and financial frictions prevent firms from accessing derivative markets. I show that private firms value hedging more than public firms, but that family owned firms are no more risk averse than non-family owned firms. I find that the cost of managing risk is especially high for high credit risk and undiversified firms. My results are consistent with financial constraints and distress costs leading firms to value hedging.
Introduction
There are strong theoretical predictions about how private and family owned firms manage risk. However, it has been challenging to find data on private firm risk management. This paper exploits a natural experiment that permits me to measure the willingness to pay for insurance, and to conduct the first comparison of the value of risk management across public, private, and family ownership.
The highway procurement context is useful because (a) firms take on oil price risk between the auction and the start of work, and (b) highway demand is plausibly exogenous to oil prices. 1 Kansas shifted oil price risk in highway procurement from the private sector to the state in 2006. Its Department of Transportation implemented the policy because, according to the Operations Director, "The volatile price of the asphalt oil has led contractors to make bids that are more costly than necessary" (Shaad 2006) . After the policy, the state hedged firms for free using a price index. Nearby Iowa has never implemented such a policy. I use a difference-in-differences (DD) design to assess the value to firms of relaxing constraints on risk management. I analyze bids to pave asphalt ("blacktop") roads with detailed procurement auction data from Iowa and Kansas between 1998 and 2012. Asphalt's primary component is bitumen, an oil product. Private firms dominate the sample, and a majority of them are family-owned. These firm types are economically important; private firms account for 99.9% of U.S. firms, and family-owned firms account for over 60% of U.S. GDP and employment (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist 2014 , Schulze et al. 2001 , Astrachan and Shanker 2003 . The firms in my data also range in size and industry diversification.
The balance of evidence indicates that the risk premium for holding crude oil futures should be quite small. 2 If firms can efficiently hedge in derivatives markets, Kansas' policy should have had little effect. Further, during the period studied oil prices increased on average between the auction and work start, so the policy should have increased procurement 1 The industry is not small; of the roughly $150 billion that the U.S. spends annually on public highway construction and maintenance, about 85% is for asphalt roads (CBO 2011).
2 See Section 2.2 for discussion.
costs if firms were risk-neutral. Instead, I find that the policy reduced Kansas' average bitumen cost by 9% and increased competition. The policy also increased the probability of winning for private and undiversified firms at the expense of, respectively, public and diversified firms.
I modulate the DD with oil price volatility to show that fully hedged firm bids are less sensitive to risk. A 100% increase in historical volatility after the policy makes bitumen bids in Iowa 14% higher than in Kansas, relative to their pre-policy difference. This estimate is robust to a litany of tests, including placebo, falsification with non-oil bid items, and alternative volatility metrics. The result translates to a 4.2% average cost of risk management.
I use two methods to address heterogeneity. First, I split the sample using the volatility-modulated DD. Second, I measure risk as the hedge period interacted with oil price volatility, excluding post-policy Kansas. For example, when the project starts the month after the auction, there is little risk regardless of recent volatility. I show that private firms have a higher cost of managing risk than public firms, and this difference is robust to excluding high credit risk and small private firms. The sharpest difference is across credit risk, with the cost at 5.9% for high risk firms and 3.1% for low risk firms, but the difference is similar in magnitude across industry diversification and and size. In particular, singlelocation firms have a much higher cost than multiple-location firms. Family-owned firms do not have a statistically different higher cost than non family-owned firms.
My results are consistent with theories in which financial constraints and distress costs lead firms to value hedging (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993 , Bolton, Chen and Wang and Smith 2011 , Purnanandam 2008 . I do not find evidence that concentration of ownership or owner-managers lead firms to manage risk in order to smooth personal income (Schulze et al. 2001, Fama and Jensen 1983) .
The firms in my data typically fully hedge by purchasing physical forward contracts from local suppliers at the time of the auction. End-user hedging through such fixed-price contracts with distributors or merchandisers is common in many industries, including agri-culture, electric utilities, and airlines. After the policy, firms bidding in an auction in Kansas choose whether or not to take the policy. If they do, payments to the winner are adjusted to account for changes in a regional bitumen price index. With only a few exceptions, all bids have opted for the policy. In accepting the index, firms take on basis risk between the actual price and the regional, survey-based index. If the cost of the forward and the index were equal, firms should choose the forward because it is a perfect hedge. However, they choose the index, which is free. Therefore the cost of the forward must exceed the cost of basis risk in the index. Further, firms' revealed preference indicates that hedging in financial markets is more expensive than the forwards and the index.
High capital requirements, basis risk, economies of scale, and daily marking to market are barriers to hedging with derivatives. The same firm attributes that make hedging valuable also make borrowing expensive. Viswanathan (2010, 2013) propose that constrained firms hedge less [in financial markets] because they have a high opportunity cost of capital. My setting is consistent with their theory, but the bracketed modifier is crucial.
Firms continue to hedge, but choose forwards -which are more expensive but require no cash up front -over financial derivative hedging. Similarly, Bolton et al. (2011) theorize that firms manage risk with cash when the the capital intensity of derivative hedging increases.
Imperfect competition is a central feature of highway procurement. Evidence from one firm's forward contracts and a phone survey of bidders suggests that monopolistic counterparties (the upstream market) can charge just less than the firm's cost of hedging in financial markets. Imperfect competition and financial frictions impede efficient allocation of risk, allowing firms to pass high and heterogeneous insurance premiums to the consumer.
Relatedly, Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) find that imperfect competition in mortgage lending decreases the pass-through of lower mortgage-backed security yields to mortgage rates, vitiating government policies aimed at home buyers. Even more broadly, my results are relevant to settings where there is a question of which party in a transaction should bear risk. For example, the Basil Committee on Banking Supervision is currently consid-ering capital requirements for bank interest rate risk (BIS 2015) . Banks can issue fixed rate instruments (like mortgages) and hedge the risk in derivative markets, but if they are face surcharges for their own hedging activities, they are more likely to forego fixed rate instruments, forcing the customer -who is likely more risk averse -to bear the risk.
There are three possible channels for heterogeneous risk management costs: (1) effective risk aversion, (2) cost of capital, or (3) risk-varying bargaining power. In the Froot et al. (1993) framework, (1) and (2) are effectively two sides of the same coin, because high external finance costs drive risk aversion. My evidence favors (1), but I cannot affirmatively identify the channel. However, the policy implications are independent of the channel: the cost of managing risk varies by firm type and aggregation by the state is more efficient.
Kansas saved around $77 million in the 6.5 years after the policy. In a hypothetical margin account calculation, I show that the cost to the state of hedging using oil futures, since it can borrow at about 1%, is effectively zero. Meanwhile, the cost of capital for the firm must be about 30% to equate the per-ton cost of an average initial margin account with the estimated cost of risk management. My results suggest that it may be more efficient to reassign risk in a given product market relationship to the party with the lowest cost of managing it. Murfin and Njoroge (2014) make a similar point on the costs for small, constrained suppliers of providing trade credit to much larger customers.
Empirical work on risk management is mixed. Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) , Allayannis and Weston (2001) , and Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) find a positive association between risk management and firm value, while Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) and Jin and Jorion (2006) do not. This paper is broadly consistent with Mackay and Moeller (2007) and Acharya, Lochstoer and Ramadorai (2013) , which are part of a body of work asserting that public firms manage risk to reduce cash flow volatility (Smithson and Simkins 2005) . 3 However, Guay and Kothari (2003) argue that in general the magnitude of corporate derivative use is too small to affect firm value. Vickery (2008) and Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) find a positive relationship between measures of financial constraints and hedging. Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) and Tufano (1996) demonstrate a positive correlation between manager ownership and effective risk aversion, and Campello et al. (2011) associate derivative use with reduced borrowing
costs. Yet Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) find that more constrained firms hedge less, and Stulz (1996) finds that larger firms hedge more.
The quasi-experiment in my setting is useful because it permits a causal interpretation of the value of risk management. Additionally, this paper seeks to address five gaps in the empirical literature. First, existing work almost exclusively addresses public firms. An exception is Cornaggia (2013) , who finds a positive association between an insurance policy and farm yields. His analysis is at the county level while mine is at the firm level. The literature on private firm financial constraints is also small (e.g. Saunders and Steffen 2011, Howell 2015) .
Second, most studies measure hedging with derivative use. Chen and Xiong (2014) show that derivative trading is conflated with speculation among commercial hedgers. An exception is the literature on liquidity and distress costs (Acharya, Almeida and Campello 2013, Acharya, Davydenko and Strebulaev 2012) . Third, it is challenging to identify data sources that are not cross-sectional or survey-based. Fourth, the risk studied can be correlated with other determinants of firm value, especially demand. Fifth, the hedging decision is endogenous to firm value. An exception here is Pérez-González and Yun (2013), who examine electric utilities' response to the introduction of weather derivatives.
Despite its advantages along these dimensions, my setting has important limitations.
In the primary analysis I do not observe hedging directly, so I cannot distinguish between hedging efficiency and risk aversion. I also do not quantify the effect of hedging on firm value.
Last, my findings are limited to a procurement auction market, and may not be applicable that oil producers with high default risk use more derivatives. My findings are also consistent with a negative correlation between idiosyncratic risk and firm value (Goyal and Santa Clara 2003) .
to corporate finance more broadly. Further research is needed to identify risk preferences and establish external validity. That said, improving efficiency in government purchasing is important; public procurement constitutes about 15% of GDP in OECD countries and 25-30% elsewhere (UNDP 2012).
Section 2 introduces the data (2.1), discusses the industry (2.2 and 2.3), and describes the risk shifting policy (2.4). Section 3 proposes the estimation strategies. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. Bitumen cost comprises 11.3% of the total bid on average for the contracts in my data, but can be up to 40%. 10 Figure 1 shows Iowa and Kansas bitumen bids (per ton bid items within the larger total project bid) over time, as well as the crude oil price and historical oil price volatility. Summary statistics of the auction data are in Table 1 , with two-tailed p-tests for difference of means across states. Iowa and Kansas are very similar in their auction format, road characteristics, and firm type distribution. They are also in close proximity geographically. However, they are not the same. My analysis relies on the 6 These novel data were provided to me by the two DOTs, and are proprietary. My research is fully independent and not subject to review by the DOTs. 7 I spoke either with a President, a Vice President, or an Estimator (who writes up the bids for DOT auctions).
8 In order to ensure that bitumen is a meaningful part of the project, I only use projects in which the portion of the total bid that is bitumen is at least $50,000. I do not study diesel, another oil product used in highway paving, because it is much smaller as a percentage of the total bid, and is not a bid line item but rather goes into a line item for general overhead. 9 The closest traded commodity is Gulf Coast high sulfur fuel oil, with which it has a correlation coefficient of 0.95.
10 These projects do not include bridge work or extensive earthwork. For Kansas, the work types I include are called overlay and surfacing, codes 20, 53, 55, 64, 65, 66, and 67. For Iowa, they are generally called paving and resurfacing, codes 1521, 1522, 1523, 1524, 1525, 1021 and 1022. assumption that unobservable differences across states are constant around the policy.
In both states the average number of bidders in an auction is 3.4. The time between the auction and the start of paving varies from less than a month to sixteen months. On average it is 4.6 months in Iowa and 5.7 months in Kansas, though these are not statistically different. Iowa has more paving projects and they are more bitumen-intensive, which is why before the policy bitumen bids in Kansas were higher than those in Iowa. Table 2 contains relevant pre-and post-risk shifting policy statistics. The difference between average per ton bitumen bids narrowed after the policy; Kansas bids were $28 higher before and only $15 higher after. The real benefit is in the actual amount paid ex-post, which changed from $36 more in Kansas before to $28 less after the policy (the wider swing is because the amount paid reflects the lowest bid).
I use two primary dependent variables. One is the unit item bid on bitumen, which is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 . The second is the total bid for the project per ton of required bitumen, which accounts for the possibility that different strategies for allocating profit among items could distort the true effect of volatility on the metric that matters to DOT, which is the overall bid for the project. Table 3 shows firm type summary statistics. It is challenging to obtain data on private firms (one reason the literature has largely avoided them). While not ideal, the variables I obtained speak to theory about financial constraints and risk aversion. There are six publicly listed firms. The majority of firms are family owned (71% in Kansas, and 79% in Iowa).
My measure of diversification is whether or not the firm does construction beyond asphalt highway paving (based on 8-digit SIC codes). This is notably different across the two states: 60% of firms in Iowa are paving-only compared to 22% in Kansas. I define credit risk to be high when D&B rates the firm high or medium risk. 11 Credit risk is also different across the 11 Where D&B does not cover a Kansas firm, I define the firm high risk if it has an annual bidding cap below the 25th percentile. The bidding cap is based on Kansas DOT knowledge of the firm's cash flow and credit risk, but Kansas was not able to share this data with me. Iowa would not provide the bidding cap itself. I use the 25th percentile because most firms effectively do not have a cap; Kansas enters $99 million into the field. Where there is no cap and no D&B rating, I assign the firm high risk, because firms that opt not to report to D&B are generally those for whom the result would not reflect well on them (based on conversation with data consultant Donald Walls).
states: 34% of Iowa firms are high risk, compared to 13% of Kansas firms.I use two measures of size. The first is based on the number of employees and revenue. D&B does not provide a time series, so this is the latest figure, generally from 2012-2014. This is not unreasonable as the industry is quite static, with relatively little growth, entry, or exit. The second measure is whether the firm has only one location firm and is not a subsidiary of a larger business.
Overall, there are more firms in Iowa (213 relative to 131 in Kansas) because it has a larger construction industry. 12 Nineteen firms bid in both states.
Within the private firms, some of these characteristics obviously proxy for each other.
Panel 2 of Table 3 shows correlations among the key variables. The correlation between family ownership and high risk is -.02. All the others are positive and less that 0.5; the highest is 0.49 between firms with a single location and small firms. Undiversified firms are also rough proxies for single location firms. Firms select into bidding on projects, so I use extensive project controls. Notable differences are that private firms bid on projects slightly further away than public firms (94 miles on average compared to 83 miles), and public firms tend to bid in more competitive auctions. Large, multiple location, and low risk firms bid on much larger projects than their small, single location, and high risk counterparts. There are no significant differences across firm types in months to start. 13
To control for the expected oil price, I use six month WTI oil futures. 14 The measures of risk are historical volatility, which is an annualized standard deviation of daily return, and implied volatility, which is derived by plugging option prices into the numerically inverted Black-Scholes (1973) Tables 2 and 3 show selection across the firm characteristics for key control variables: bitumen quantity, miles between the firm and the project, number of bidders in the auction, and months between the auction and work start.
14 There is disagreement about whether the futures price or the current spot price is the best forecast of future oil prices (Alquist and Kilian 2010, Kellogg 2010) . Here I use the six month futures price, following convention in the literature on volatility and the fact that the average time to work start is five months. Futures contracts not purchased for physical delivery close or roll over at the end of the month prior to the delivery month.
15 This is:
T where T is the number of trading days in the year (⇠252) and N is the period over which volatility is measured. O t are returns, or daily percent changes in the weeks, and at-the-money implied volatility for options expiring in three months (these are considered directly comparable). Historical volatility is the more natural measure, as paving firms are cognizant of recent oil price trends but do not report looking at options on oil futures, much less implied volatility. I focus on results using 12-week historical volatility, but show robustness to 26-week and implied volatility.
Risk Management
Paving firms face cost uncertainty when they bid -if oil prices rise between the auction and work start, the firm's bitumen cost will increase. 16 It is not obvious that managing this risk should be costly; there is no consensus on the oil price risk premium, but conventional asset pricing models fail to explain returns and a number of recent studies were unable to reject a zero risk premium for long-only commodity portfolios (Basu and Miffre 2013, Erb and Harvey 2006) . Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2012) show that commodity returns are negatively correlated with inventories. Oil prices are close to a random walk; Alquist and Kilian (2010) show that the no-change forecast is much more accurate than forecasts based on oil futures or oil futures spreads. Ahn and Kogan (2011) report an oil equity beta between 1971 and 2010 at 0.01. One-factor betas change sign over time, and are rarely more than 0.5 (see Appendix Figure 1 ), implying a premium of at most 1.5%. Note that macroeconomic growth can correlate with oil prices moving up or down, depending on the source of the shock: growth may cause a positive demand shock, increasing prices, while a positive supply shock decreases prices, which has a positive effect on growth (Anderson, Kellogg and Salant 2014) .
Although there is no obvious benchmark, the balance of evidence therefore indicates
where p t is the daily futures contract price. "Model-free" option-implied volatility metrics have been developed to deal with perceived issues with Black-Scholes, but these are beyond the scope of this paper (see Bollerslev et al. 2011) . 16 I do not address the risk of losing the auction. Anecdotal evidence from interviews suggests that paving firms are risk-averse towards input costs but risk-neutral towards an individual auction for a particular project. Firms participate in many auctions and treat them as a portfolio. While the risk of losing any given auction is idiosyncratic, oil price risk for the coming construction season is highly correlated across projects.
that excess returns to holding oil futures (the simplest hedge) should be quite small. Firms can manage risk with hedges, insurance, or diversification. The highway pavers in my data often fully insure by signing physical forward contracts with suppliers before the auction. If the firm wins, the contract binds. Sometimes they wait to sign later, and occasionally they don't hedge at all or, very rarely, hedge in financial markets. 17 The forward contracts are essentially a reservation price of hedging; if firms choose forwards rather than hedging in financial markets, the latter must be at least as costly. Suppliers buy and store bitumen year-round, so at the time of the auction they are partially physically hedged against the short positions they are taking in their contracts with paving firms. However, in the supplier-paver relationship, the supplier generally has downside risk while the paver has upside risk. If the supplier has total bargaining power, 17 The physical forward contracts are based on quotes that paving firms request from bitumen suppliers before the auction. The paving firm typically signs a contract with one supplier committing to purchase the bitumen at the quoted price at the time of work start should he win the project. The price is good only for the DOT project specified in the contract, but the bitumen can be taken typically any time during the construction season (roughly mid-April to the end of October, because paving requires a road temperature no less than 55º F). The supplier must have sufficient bitumen stored to cover all contracted supply. Although end-use demand for bitumen only exists for half the year, oil refineries produce bitumen year-round as a byproduct. The refineries typically don't store bitumen, so they sell it to third parties who own terminals (storage capacity). the forward price could include both sides' risk premiums.
Hedging is sometimes considered a zero-cost transaction on an expected value basis, but in practice hedging in financial markets creates exposure to cash flow risk. To illustrate, consider Southwest Airlines, whose 2014 Annual Report states: "The Company is also subject to the risk that cash collateral may be required to be posted to fuel hedge counterparties, which could have a significant impact on the Company's financial position and liquidity."
Southwest paid $60 million in premiums to hedge 34% of its 2014 jet fuel consumption using option collars and swaps. Despite instruments that should minimize losses and much less hedging than usual, Southwest lost $256 million on its positions, bringing fuel hedging costs to 28% of net income. 18
Southwest's hedging instruments require payment up front and scale. The alternative is to hedge in futures markets, which require a performance bond, or "margin," which is marked-to-market every day and changes regularly to reflect volatility. 19 Suppose that an average firm in my data used oil futures to hedge its annual bitumen needs, choosing a hedge ratio to minimize basis risk. It would purchase about 16 six month WTI crude oil futures contracts in January (auctions are usually held in the winter, and paving done in the summer). Figure 6 shows the results of this exercise for years for which I was able to gather historical margin requirement data. 20 The dots below zero are instances when oil prices go down and the margin account does not have a large cushion, so the firm must wire in money or have its positions liquidated. The graphs show that the margin account requirement varies, and on average is about $150,000. 21 This does not include margin calls 18 Southwest Airlines 2014 Annual Report. 19 Clearinghouses minimize defaults by requiring both parties on a futures contract to post "initial" cash, set as a dollar amount per futures contract. If the account declines below a "maintenance" amount (slightly below the initial amount), the exchange initiates a margin call. A bank or speculator may post collateral (e.g. T-bills or gold) initially and to maintain the margin, but a firm (especially a private one) would likely fund a margin uncollateralized. 20 Sixteen contracts (where contracts are denominated in 1,000 barrels) is the rough oil equivalent of 2970 tons of bitumen, which is the average project amount (928 tons) times the number of projects the average firm wins (3.2). (For conversion rates, see EIA). The margin account requirement is the CME spec amount for 5-10 month CL6 contracts. 21 Margin data from Esben Hedegaard at AQR and Thomas Kilmer at CME; and discussion with Kenny Tang, a commodity trader at Kotke Associates, and Joe Brogden, a broker at retail brokerage OptionsXpress. Economies of scale and basis risk are further barriers to hedging in financial markets for small firms (Mian 1996 , Géczy et al. 1997 , Haushalter 2000 . Investing in a fund may not be ideal either. Bhardwaj, Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2014) show that commodity trading advisors on average provide excess returns (after fees) to investors of roughly zero. They conclude that the best rationale for investors' continued use of these vehicles is information asymmetry. In interviews, executives of firms in my data consistently viewed hedging in financial markets as complicated and expensive gambling. A final reason the firms may not hedge in financial markets is information costs or lack of sophistication. They are mostly small, local, and do not have in-house financial expertise. 22 The alternative financial markets hedge strategy is to purchase call options on futures. Although the firm loses at most the cost of the options and has upside potential, this is on average a more costly strategy (and more complex). The firm must purchase more options than the underlying oil quantity to achieve a 1-to-1 hedge, navigating the declining delta of the option as it moves out of the money.
An Imperfectly Competitive Environment
In a competitive environment high cost of risk firms would be bid out of the market. Like many industries, highway construction is characterized by imperfect competition.
Inelastic demand, high barriers to entry, information asymmetry, easy defection detection, auction setups where phony bids are possible, and a static market environment are all conducive to collusion and are features of highway procurement (Porter 2005) . Porter and Zona (1993) , Ishii (2008) , and Pesendorfer (2000) demonstrate collusive bidding in highway procurement, and Bajari and Ye (2003) note the widespread incidence of cartels in procurement auctions more generally. Gupta (2002) finds collusion in Florida highway procurement and estimates that this type of auction is not competitive until there are 8 bidders. In my data, the average is 3.4.
In an interview, one CEO told me that imperfect competition permits even very risk averse pavers to stay in business. Paving firms and bitumen suppliers are in oligopolistic, territorial equilibria. This illustrated in Appendix Figures 6-10, which show the location of auction wins and losses for five large bidders. Wins are concentrated in a portion of the state while losses predominate outside that territory. Unreported maps for other major bidders show a similar pattern. Spatial oligopoly is a natural result of high transportation costs;
with perfect competition rents are zero on territory boundaries and positive within.
The bitumen suppliers are a second layer of imperfect competition. Like the paving firms, suppliers enjoy markups within their territories at least as large as the differential transportation cost for the next-closest supplier. Suppliers provide quotes to paving firms before each auction, and itemized bids are published immediately afterwards. In interviews, the suppliers suggested that recent auctions may provide a signaling mechanism, as in Friedman's (1971) . 23 The suppliers charge the pavers if not their full cost of risk, at least a significant portion. Thus this context features imperfect competition in two layers of prod-23 "...It seems unsatisfactory for firms to achieve only the profits of the Cournot point when each firm must realize more can be simultaneously obtained by each. This line of argument often leads to something called 'tacit collusion' under which firms are presumed to act as if they colluded. How they do this is not entirely clear, though one explanation is that their market moves are interpretable as messages" (Friedman 1971 ). uct markets.
The Natural Experiment
The federal government has urged state DOTs to remove oil price risk from highway contractors since the early 1970s, but the policy only became widespread in the mid-2000s.
To my knowledge there is no quantitative analysis of whether, in fact, private firms were charging the government excessive risk premiums, nor has there been any effort to evaluate the policies' effectiveness. Risk shifting policies are now used in most states and there seems to be consensus in the policy community that any cost to the government of bearing oil price risk is offset by lower bids (Skolnik 2011) . In the only analysis thus far, Kosmopoulou and Zhou (2014) examine one state, Oklahoma, so they cannot control for economic and other factors. They attribute their finding that firms bid more aggressively after the policy to the winner's curse effect, and assume firms are risk-neutral. There has been no analysis of whether this policy produced cost savings for Kansas or any other state.
The Kansas DOT implemented its bitumen risk shifting policy (called a "price adjustment policy") in August 2006. The precipitating event, according to senior KDOT officials, was a contractor bidding an outrageously high price for a contract in which he was the only bidder, claiming that he could not get a firm price from suppliers. Kansas uses a price index, which it purchases from a private data firm, to adjust its payments to account for changes in bitumen prices between the auction and the time of work. When prices go up, the firm is paid his bid plus the index increase, and when prices go down, the firm receives his bid less the index decrease. 24 24 Specifically, each month KDOT publishes an Asphalt Material Index (AMI), which they purchase from Poten & Partners. Bidders incorporate the current month's AMI into their bid for asphalt. The AMI for the month of the letting becomes the Starting Asphalt Index (SAI) for the duration of the contract. KDOT technicians take samples from the mix being placed. This serves both to monitor quality and to obtain a percent bitumen content to adjust payment based on the change in the AMI. The difference between the SAI and the AMI to the nearest dollar becomes the adjustment factor, applied to work completed during that month. The adjustment only occurs when the AMI differs from the SAI by $10 or more. The Kansas price index is almost identical to the Argus Media spot price index I use elsewhere in the paper. Both are created from surveys of recent bilateral transactions. The KDOT index is for PG 64-22 but KDOT applies it to all grades. For the index, see: http://www.ksdot.org/burconsmain/ppreq/asphaltpriceindex.asp. For the specifications, see: http://www.ksdot.org/burconsmain/specprov/pdf/90m-0295-r01.pdf.
Iowa has not pursued such a policy, apparently because officials never became interested despite experiencing similar cost escalation. Iowa, located immediately to the northeast of Kansas, has similar weather patterns, road systems, and auction characteristics.
Since the policy, Kansas firms are fully hedged for free, except for basis risk. This is not automatic; firms must agree to participate when they submit their bid. However, there have only been one or two instances (out of about 500 bids) in which a contractor has not opted for the index. Appendix Figure 2 graphs the ex-post contract price adjustments over time. In accepting the index, firms are not eliminating all risk; in fact they are accepting an inferior instrument to the forward contract, which is full insurance with no basis risk.
I use the 105 Firm Z forward contracts to provide an anecdotal measure of the risk premium in the forwards relative to the index price, which also provides an upper bound on the basis risk. Specifically, the risk premium is the forward contract price less the realized index price in the week that work starts (typically, the forward contract price is dated in the winter, and work starts the following summer). 25 The individual premiums are graphed in Appendix Figure 11 . The average risk premium is 24% of the forward contract price, and its standard deviation is 10%. By choosing the index over their forwards, firms avoided paying the premium but took on basis risk. Since firms use the index when it is available and forwards otherwise, we can infer that the basis risk in the index is no more than 10%, and that hedging in financial markets must be costlier than both of these options.
3 Estimation Strategy I use a difference-in-differences design to ask whether the policy affected firms in Kansas. The key identifying assumption is that nothing changed in Iowa at the same time as the 2006 risk shifting policy in Kansas. The DD intuition is that if two groups are ex-ante similar and one is subject to treatment in the second of two time periods, then with controls for treatment and group the estimated coefficient on the treated group should be the average difference between treatment and control, without bias from time trends and permanent differences between groups. I estimate the following regression, where the dependent variable is the price that Kansas paid after adjusting the winning bid to account for oil price changes:
Cost sj = ↵ + 1 I Kansas j · I P ost P olicy t + 2 I P ost P olicy t + 3 I Kansas j
The coefficient of interest ( 1 ) gives the mean difference across states (s 2 Kansas, Iowa)
in the actual price paid by the government after the policy, controlling for the pre-policy difference. 26 Since the policy, oil prices have increased on average between the auction and work start, so the policy should have increased procurement costs if firms were risk-neutral.
I estimate the effect of risk by modulating the DD framework with oil price volatility.
The competitive equilibrium in Kansas among pavers and between pavers and suppliers may have changed after the policy. However, changes that are unrelated to oil price risk should be controlled for by state and time fixed effects. Interacting volatility with the DD design provides some of the superior robustness of a triple differences design (Imbens and Wooldridge 2007) . The regression, where i indexes bidders, j indexes auctions, and t indexes letting day, is
The dependent variable is the log bitumen bid, price oil volatility on bids in Kansas relative to Iowa after oil price risk shifted to the public sector.
I examine cross-sectional heterogeneity in two ways. First, I split the volatility modulated DD by firm type. However, the data does not permit adding a fourth interaction and the additional three-and two-way control interaction, which limits the ability to interpret differences across models. Therefore, the second approach is to measure risk as the forward market interacted with oil price volatility. Specifically, I exclude post-policy Kansas (where there was no risk) and evaluate how oil price volatility affects bids that are submitted at auctions with varying distances in time from the work start date. For example, when the project starts the month after the auction, there is little risk regardless of recent volatility.
The estimating equation is:
The risk metric is the square-rooted number of months between the auction and work start times logged oil price volatility If certain types of firms have higher costs of bearing risk, then removing barriers to hedging should benefit these firms at the expense of their counterparts and increase competition. Indeed, I find that the policy increased competition in Kansas relative to Iowa, and benefited privately owned and non-diversified firms at the expense of public firms and diversified firms. Using the number of bidders in the auction as the dependent variable, column III of Table 4 shows that the policy increased the number of bidders in auctions by 0.8, relative to an average of 3.4. Liu and Parlour (2009) argue that hedging should lead to greater competition and lower rents if firms commit to a hedge prior to participating in an auction. They use a winner-take-all auction setting where firms face a common risk. When firms invest in a hedging portfolio that is not contingent on the auction outcome, competition in the auction increases. The losing firms are now over-hedged. In highway paving, the forward bitumen contracts are contingent on winning the auction, unlike financial futures or options. Thus firms can hedge using physical forwards without competing away rents. Liu and Parlour's conclusions explain why competition increased after the policy. They show that hedging leads to a loss in social welfare borne by the seller, and conclude: "it is to the seller's advantage to...reduce the bid-to-award period or to hedge the common value of the project himself." Kansas (the "seller") pursued precisely the latter strategy in 2006. My results show that fully insuring the pavers -eliminating any need to hedge -benefited Kansas, despite oil prices generally increasing between the auction and the time of work. This supports Liu and Parlour's theory that when hedges are contingent on winning (as is the case when firms must hedge themselves), firms do not compete away the benefits of hedging. Instead, they capture them at the expense of the seller.
The policy seems to have increased competition by leveling the playing field. Columns IV and V of Table 4 show that after the policy, private firms are 19 percentage points more likely to win after the policy than before, relative to an average of 74%. The dependent variable is an indicator for winning, and the estimating equation is a triple differences design, where the coefficient of interest is on I Kansas j · I P ost P olicy t · I P rivately owned i . All six individual and single difference interactions are included. Bids are the unit of observation rather than auctions.
The average probabilities in each state moved in opposite directions: the probability that a private firm won in Kansas increased from 71% before the policy to 77% after, while it decreased from 91% to 81% in Iowa. Volatile oil prices in Iowa in 2008 and 2009 seem to have favored the public firms, while private firms in Kansas were protected and increased market share. I find the same effect (20 percentage points) for firms that are only in the asphalt paving business relative to diversified firms. On average, Kansas paving-only firms' probability of winning increased from 33% to 60%, while this chance decreased for Iowa paving-only firms from 45% to 26%. Here, the controls decrease the average cross-stage change. 31 Logit specifications produce similar results, but they are magnified because logit drops groups (e.g. county-months) with no "successes" (e.g. paving-only firm wins). The odds ratios for private vs. public and paving-only vs. diversified are 2.8 and 4, respectively (Appendix Table 4 ).
The distribution of winning bids changed after the policy. In Figure 7 , the bar heights indicate the number of firms in each category of auction win percentage. Kurtosis, or peakedness and fatness of tails, declined from 4.9 to 3, where 3 is precisely the kurtosis of the normal distribution. Skewness also declined. 32 This means that the "winningness" of firms was more evenly distributed across firms after the policy. The distributional changes are consistent with a more competitive market. There was little firm entry or exit. 31 I do not find statistically significant effects for other firm characteristics. 32 Skewness measures a distribution's symmetry, where a normal distribution has a skewness coefficient of 0. When the coefficient is positive, the median is less than the mean and the distribution is skewed right, and vice versa when it is negative. A skewness coefficient greater than 1 indicates that the distribution is highly skewed. Kurtosis measures the peakedness of the distribution, where the normal distribution has kurtosis of 3. Kurtosis greater than 3 has more observations closer to the mean and fatter tails than the normal distribution.
Cost of Risk
The Kansas risk shifting policy reduced the responsiveness of bids to oil price volatility, relative to the "control" state of Iowa. Table 5 shows the results using the primary specification and historical volatility. The value of -0.14 for 1 in Column I means that a one standard deviation increase in volatility, or a 14% increase, decreases bids in Kansas relative to Iowa by 2%, relative to their pre-policy difference. 33 Using the log total bid per ton bitumen as the dependent variable (column II) gives a very similar coefficient of -0.15. 
Heterogeneity in the the Cost of Risk
I expect external finance to be more costly for private firms, and testing whether this is the case is a main contribution of this paper. I also confirm that within privately owned investigate size, which is a The widely usedSize is a widely used proxy for financial constraints in the literature. Small firms usually have less collateralizable assets than large firms, so are often assumed to face more severe financing constraints (Hennessy and Whited 2007, Nance, Smith and Smithson 1993) . Industry diversification should also lead to a lower cost of oil price risk; firms that only pave asphalt roads should face a higher probability of distress from 33 Both variables are log-transformed, so multiplying volatility by e leads to a multiplicative eˆ 1 increase in bids. More intuitively, a 10% increase in volatility multiplies bids by eˆ 1 ·ln(1.1) , in this case decreases Kansas bids by 1.4% relative to Iowa.
34 Four percent of the overall average bid of $318 is $12.7. Section 2.2 calculated an initial margin account of $134,400 to hedge 2,970 tons of bitumen with 16 oil futures contracts. To borrow $134,400 at a cost of $12.7 per ton implies a 30% cost of capital.
an oil price spike. Last, credit risk is a direct measure of the probability of distress; I expect that if distress costs help explain the value of insurance, as suggested in Froot et al. (1993) , these firms will find the risk shifting policy particularly helpful. I examine owner diversification using the family-owned firms, which make up 78% of private firms in the data. Owners of family firms are usually also managers and have the bulk of their wealth in the firm. These undiversified manager-owners may maximize personal utility and smooth income through the firm (Bertrand and Schoar 2006 , Shleifer and Vishny 1986 , Schulze et al. 2001 . If this undiversified-owner phenomenon explains the risk premium, I would expect family firms to charge a higher risk premium.
I explore heterogeneity across firm types in two ways. First, I split the sample, as the specification is too complex for an additional set of interactions. Table 5 columns III and IV find that the policy's effect is -0.14 for private firms and -0.11 for public firms (significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively). Though in the expected direction, the difference is small in magnitude and they are not statistically different with a high level of confidence. This is also true for the coefficients separating family-and non-family-owned firms.
A sharper difference is between high and low credit risk firms. The coefficients, in Table 6 columns I-II, are -0.25 and -0.12, respectively, implying a cost of oil price risk for high credit risk firms of 5.9%, compared to 3.1% for low risk firms. This does not simply reflect an overlap with family ownership; in Appendix Table 5 , I show a similar result when I compare high risk, non-family-owned firms with low risk, non-family-owned firms. A natural hedge is diversification away from oil-intensive construction to projects like sewers or concrete highways. Indeed, diversification also offers a sharp contrast; the coefficients of -0.19 for paving-only firms and -0.09 for diversified firms (Table 6 columns V and VI). Similarly, Mackay and Moeller (2007) and Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2011) find that well-diversified firms are less risk averse. The diversification result is not driven by family owned firms (see Appendix Table 5 column I).
The coefficient among single-location, non-subsidiary firms is -0.18, relative to an insignificant -0.08 for other firms (Table 6 columns III and IV) . The other size metric, dividing the sample based on revenue and employment (Table 6 columns the coefficient on the triple interaction of being public with risk (time to start times log volatility) is -.065 using the whole sample, significant at the 5% level (column I). When I limit the sample to low credit risk firms, the coefficient increases to -.09 and is significant at the 1%. High risk firms are by definitely closer to distress and naturally have a higher cost of risk. They create noise within the public-private comparison, and for other characteristics create a concern that any effect may reflect correlation with high credit risk.
The following columns compare family and non-family owned firms. There is no effect, regardless of the sample. Here and for subsequent characteristics, I also include a specification limiting the sample to private firms. In Table 8 I find a coefficient of .04 for paving only firms relative to diversified firms (column I, significant at the 10% level), which increases to .06 and becomes highly significant when I limit the sample to low risk firms.
Columns IV-VI look at single location firms relative to multiple location firms, and yield very similar and highly significant coefficients. Finally, I examine high vs. low credit risk in columns VII-VIII. As expected, high risk firms are more risk averse than low risk firms.
This effect is very strong and significant when I limit the sample to private firms.
These coefficients are challenging to interpret, so I graph marginal effects of the public-private and single-multiple location relationships (including high risk firms to be conservative) in Figures 8 and 9 . These permit me to decompose the marginal effect of the two elements of risk: oil price volatility and the hedge period. Each panel of Figure 8 holds volatility fixed at its 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles and allows the time between the auction and work start to increase. The regression demonstrated that public firms bid less then private firms at high levels of risk. The graphs show that this negative effect is driven by the time between the auction and work start, but only at high levels of volatility. Figure   9 holds fixed time to start at 6 months (panel A) and 12 months (panel B). It shows how the effect of being a single location firm relative to a multiple-location firm varies with oil price volatility. As risk increases, single location firms bid relatively more. The effect is exaggerated when there is a long hedge period.
In part because I do not directly observe all paver-supplier contracts, I cannot identify the channel of heterogeneity in risk premiums. The channel is either effective risk aversion, cost of capital, or risk-varying bargaining power. In the Froot et al. (1993) framework, the first two are effectively two sides of the same coin, because high external finance costs drive risk aversion. A narrow interpretation of my results is that I identify varying costs of capital.
That is, firms may or may not have varying risk aversion, but some do not have the scale or liquidity to hedge in financial markets. However, the consensus among the executives that I interviewed was that some firms are more risk averse and thus less likely to buy spot. These firms continue to sign forwards at very high prices when oil is volatile, while others are more willing to wait, and sign in the intervening period between the auction and the work.
A third explanation is that my result reflects varying bargaining power with suppliers.
The modulated DD isolates the effect of risk, so this interpretation requires bargaining power to vary with risk. Again, because I find a much weaker effect of firm size on the cost of risk than other characteristics, it seems unlikely that bargaining power alone explains my results.
However, it if does, the implications are the same: in this setting, the cost of risk varies by firm type and aggregation is more efficient. The channel is simply more narrowly related to a certain product market equilibrium.
Robustness Tests
I conducted a rich array of robustness tests. An important subset for the full sample modulated DD (Table 5 column I) is in Table 9 . Columns I and II show the single-difference impact of being in Kansas after the policy, controlling separately for oil price volatility. The mean effect of the policy is an insignificant -0.02. When I limit the sample to periods of high volatility (column II), the coefficient becomes -0.1, significant at the 1% level. This confirms the main result that volatility drives the triple difference coefficient.
Column III omits auction and bidder controls, which increases the coefficient to -0.19.
Column IV omits the county fixed effects, which leaves the result essentially unchanged at -0.17. Alternative specifications for standard errors are state-month clusters in V and no clusters in VI. Column VII tests for parallel trends, and shows that there was no difference across states in their response to risk prior to the policy.
An alternative explanation for my results is that high volatility periods coincided with relatively low spot prices for Kansas firms, while Iowa firms had locked in high prices from the previous period. The year 2008 had unprecedented volatility, with a spike at the end of the year and then a dramatic fall in 2009. During 2009, any such price differential should have been highest. Column VIII shows that the effect is -0.13 excluding 2009. Placebo tests are in columns IX and X, where the policy implementation year is artificially set to 2002 or 2008. The effect decreases to -0.07 in both specifications, and is significant only at the 10% level. Note that both of these include the policy, so these results are to be expected.
Appendix Table 6 contains additional robustness checks. With no interactions (column I), there are robust positive effects of being in Kansas, oil price volatility, and the policy. There is also a strong positive effect of the I P ost P olicyt · V ol oil t interaction when the triple interaction is omitted (column II). I conduct a falsification test, where the dependent variable is the total bid excluding the bitumen bid item (column III) . The coefficient on the triple interaction is now 0.06, likely reflecting oil intensity (e.g. in diesel fuel) throughout the project. Column IV omits month-of-year fixed effects, which yields about the same result as the main specification (-.15).
Further alternative error assumptions are in columns V-VII; the significance at the 1% level is unchanged with firm-month, firm-month-of-year, and firm-state clusters. Alternative oil measures are in columns VIII-X. With implied volatility, the effect increases to -0.35, reflecting implied volatility's lower variability. Column IX shows that the coefficient is unchanged using 26-week historical volatility instead of 12-week volatility. Column X uses 5 month futures instead of 6 month, and finds a very similar coefficient of -0.13. All of the Appendix Table 6 results are significant at the 1% level, except for columns III and X, which are significant at the 5% level. Last, I test whether the effect of the policy is as strong for the 19 firms who bid in both states. Appendix Table 7 shows that the main effect is not statistically significant and has a magnitude of -0.7 among these firms, which makes sense since they continue to face risk in Iowa, but are also larger and better diversified to begin with. The effect is much larger, at -0.19 and significant at the 1% level, for firms that bid in only one state. Froot et al. (1993) show that hedging allows firms to invest even in bad cash flow states, so firms are most likely to hedge when cash flows are negatively correlated with investment opportunities. My setting exemplifies this situation; highway contractors tend to be cash flow constrained at precisely the time of year when they are most exposed to oil price risk. I show that these firms charge a large premium for bearing an idiosyncratic risk.
Conclusion
There may be demand among small firms for simple, low transaction-cost risk management markets or aggregation services.
Firms that are publicly listed, diversified, and not family-owned charge lower risk premiums relative to their counterpart firms. These results support the hypothesis that undiversified owners and financial constraints generate greater demand for risk management either because these characteristics are associate with greater risk aversion or a higher cost of capital.
A limitation of this analysis is its industry-specific focus on public procurement and asphalt paving. However, the firms in my sample much more adequately represent the size and ownership distribution of U.S. firms than the majority of past studies on risk management, which mostly address only large, publicly listed corporations. Imperfect competition in product markets combined with financial frictions -both of which prevail in many sectors -prevent the consumer from getting the benefit of efficient markets for risk. Each observation is an auction in I and III, and a bid in II, IV, V. The dependent variable in IV and V is 1 if the firm won the auction, and each column interacts the policy effect with a firm type. N is lower in I because KDOT lost some payments data. † Unreported controls are log total non-bitumen bid, log bitumen tons proposed, log paver miles to project, average total bid in the auction, oil price, and the number of bidders (in I,III). Standard errors clustered by firm. *** p < .01. 
1 0 3 7 4 4 5 5 1 5 8 4 4 2 8 0 2 8 0 3 2 9 0 2 3 4 9 8 2 3 8 7 The dependent variable is the log bitumen item bid except in II, where it is the total bid divided by the tons of bitumen used. III-VI divide the sample by firm characteristics (see Table 2 for descriptions). † Unreported controls are log total non-bitumen bid, log bitumen tons proposed, log paver miles to project, average total bid in the auction, and the number of bidders. Standard errors clustered by firm. *** p < .01. + " sij I limit the sample to certain types of firms in some specifications (e.g. high credit risk). † Unreported controls are log total non-bitumen bid, log bitumen tons proposed, log paver miles to project, average total bid in the auction, and the number of bidders. Standard errors clustered by firm. *** p < .01. Note: This figure shows a physical forward contract between a large paver in my data and a local bitumen supplier. These contracts have long been and remain the industry standard for purchasing bitumen.
Figure 5: Firm Z Physical Forward Bitumen Contracts
Note: This figure shows the bitumen prices in 100 forward physical contracts between one large paving firm and bitumen suppliers, as well as the spot oil price.
Figure 6: Hypothetical Margin Requirements for Hedging with Oil Futures
Note: This figure shows the capital an average firm needs to hedge annual bitumen (purchase 16 6 month crude oil futures contracts in Jan., as auctions are usually in winter, work in summer). Overnight maintenance is the amount the firm needs to deposit overnight to maintain its margin. Table 7 Column I. Each panel holds volatility fixed at a certain level and shows how the effect of being public relative to private varies with the time between the auction and work start. As risk increases, public firms bid less than private firms, and these graphs show that this negative effect is driven by the time between the auction and work start, but only at high levels of volatility.
Figure 9: Marginal Effect of Single Location, Non-subsidiary Status on Bids at Varying Volatility Levels
Note: These figures graph marginal effects from the regression in Table 7 Column III. The panels hold time to between the auction and work start fixed at 6 and 12 months respectively, and show how the effect of being a single location firm relative to a multiple-location firm varies with oil price volatility. As risk increases, single location firms bid relatively more. The effect is exaggerated when there is a long hedge period.
